Monthly Status and Progress Report for July 1949: A Report Submitted by the New York Operations Office

August 10, 1949

W.E. Kelley, Manager

(See scanned photocopy of this document)

Background. During the past few years, a great many communities have shown increasing intolerance toward air pollution associated with the operation of their industries. In most cities, the efforts for air pollution abatement has been initiated by civic organizations. The disastrous Donora episode of last winter provided considerable impetus to these campaigns.

Several years ago, the city of Cleveland established an Air Pollution Division in the City Health Department under the direction of Mr. Herbert Dycter. During the past year there has been local dissatisfaction with the progress being made by that Division, and recently, the Southwest Civic Association retained Dr. C.A. Mills of the University of Cincinnati and Dr. Sadtler of Philadelphia to survey the problem and assist in the campaign to reduce the air contamination.

The air pollution problems of Cleveland are centered in the valley of the Cuyahoga River, a highly industrialized area in Southwest Cleveland. The complaints, to the best of our knowledge, have been non-specific insofar as no one component of the heterogeneous air pollution originating from this valley has been mentioned as being of prime significance.

"Area C" of Harshaw Chemical Co., operating under contract with this office, discharge both uranium and fluorides in its atmospheric wastes. The principal effluent from the main Harshaw plant, located adjacent to Area C, is hydrofluoric acid.

The main Harshaw plant is not engaged in work for the Commission except as it serves to supply Area C with HF. Although the complaints from the civic organizations have been concerned with general atmospheric pollution, and neither fluoride nor uranium have been mentioned specifically, it is likely that as time progresses, the extent of air pollution by fluorides will receive attention.

NYOO Investigation. In view of the attention which air pollution in west Cleveland is currently receiving in the local press, it was considered adviseable to obtain information as to the relationship of the various Harshaw operations to the general air pollution problem. An investigation was therefore initiated to determine (1) the levels of fluoride contamination which exist in the atmosphere within approximately 4,000 feet of the Harshaw plant, and the extent to which Harshaw Chemical Company and Area C each contribute to this concentration by uranium.

In view of the fact that the main Harshaw plant was scheduled to shut down for vacation on June 6, it was decided that this study should be conducted with end without this unit in operation for the purposes of obtaining comparative data. It was further decided that the worthwhile additional data would be obtained by shutting down Area C to coincide with part of the period during which the main Harshaw plant was not in operation. Fluoride and uranium measurements in the vicinity wre therefore made (1) with both Area C and the main Harshaw plant in operation, (2) with the main Harshaw plant shut down, and (3) with both the main Harshaw plant and Area C shut down.

It should be noted that it was not possible to obtain data with the main Harshaw plant in full operation because the bi-fluoride unit was shut down prior to the time this study was planned. It is our understanding that the bi-fluoride unit probably will not operate for at least another three months, and then not in its original form. Harshaw is making extensive alterations in order to reduce atmospheric emissions from this unit.

It was decided to devote the study to the area within 4,000 feet of the Harshaw plant. By so doing, it would be possible to obtain more than adequate coverage of the area in which effluent from the Harshaw plants would be of maximum significance and studies beyond this distance would not be necessary unless it could be shown that air pollution originating from these units was significant at the perimter of this area.

Data were collected simultaneously from 3 mobile and 4 fixed sampling stations; and from the eight Area C stacks.

In order to determine the extent to which Area C was contributing to air pollution by uraniums and fluorides, the following 4 criteria were established:

1. If data is corrected for variations in wind velocity, the measured effluents should correlate with downwind concentration.

2. The concentrations measured downwind of the plant should diminish with distance.

3. The measurements downwind of the plant should agree, at least in order of magnitude, with the concentrations predictable by theory, from the knowledge of the rate at which the pollution is being emitted from the plant.

4. With Area C shut down, there should be a marked reduction, if not complete elimination of the air pollution.

Results. As expected, the uranium data satisfied all 4 criteria. The atmospheric concentrations of uranium were lower than the maximum permissible level recommended by the Commission. The fluoride data however satisfied none of the criteria. Of particular significance was the finding of high fluoride concentrations when both Harshaw plants were shut down. It was further concluded that the fluoride contamination in west Cleveland within 3,500 feet of the Harshaw plants originated from sources other than Area C of the HF plant. As noted previously, the Harshaw bi-fluoride plant was not in operation at any time during these tests. It is therefore impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the extent to which the full Harshaw operations contribute to the fluoride contamination. However, the HF plant was in operation during Period 1 of this study, but did not appear to be contributing significantly to the air pollution.

Complete data and detailed analyses are given in a report which has just been issued by the NYOO Medical Division.

The following declassified study was perfomed under "Contract W-7401-eng-49 for the Manhattan Project at the University of Rochester at the suggestion of Harold C. Hodge, professor of pharmacology and toxicology" (JADA).

The study was later published in an edited and altered form, in the Journal of the American Dental Association, August 1948, Vol. 27, No. 2, p 131-140.

A STUDY OF DENTAL CONDITIONS IN WORKERS EXPOSED TO DILUTE AND ANHYDROUS HYDROFLUORIC ACID IN PRODUCTIONS

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF ORAL EXAMINATIONS OF FORTY-SEVEN WORKERS AT THE CLEVELAND PLANT OF THE HARSHAW CHEMICAL COMPANY

Cleveland, Ohio, October 13-14-15, 1943

Of the forty-seven men examined, thirty-six were actively engaged in the production of hydrofluoric acid and were working continuously in an atmosphere laden with acid fumes. Eleven were employed in the plant offices or in sections of the plant removed from direct contact with hydrofluoric acid or its fumes. No women were accepted for study.

Findings

The hydrofluoric acid workers examined, on the whole, appeared to be unusually healthy men, physically sound, and comparatively immune to colds, infections and other commonplace illnesses. Active carious lesions were not observed in subjects exposed to the acid in production. This finding was made in spite of the fact that, as a group, these men neglected their mouths, employed little or no oral hygiene, and were in large proportion edentulous or nearly edentulous. Periodontoclasia was a common finding in subjects of experimental and control groups, but it is not likely that the incidence and severity of the disease was greater than in other men of comparable age and living habits.

The teeth of the men exposed to the acid appeared to be either highly polished and glasslike, presenting a surface comparable to that of highly glazed porcelain, or dulled with a peculiar brownish deposit which seemed to cover the enamel of the anterior teeth in especially large quantity. Although visual examination did not ascertain whether the teeth suffered loss of substance as a result of the action of the acid, there was some indication that there may have been etched and polished by it. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that the teeth of exposed individuals revealed more than the usual signs of attrition, and that although most of the men chewed tobacco to preven inhalation of dust and fumes, it is possible that exposure of the teeth to the influence of acid may have contributed to the attrition observed.

Environment

The concentration of obnoxious dust and fumes in the atmosphere of the production plant discouraged the presence of domestic animals such as the dog or cat. It was found through conversation with the men that fruit allowed to stand in th atmosphere of the plant would dehydrat but not rot. Bacterial cultures of organisms collected from the air adjacent to and remote from the scene of acid production indicated fewer organisms exist in the presence of the fumes. It is not unreasonable to postulate that this finding may be related to the comparatively high degree of immunity to colds, and infection enjoyed by the plant workers.

Further evidence of air pollution was found in the observation that window glass in buildings housing retorts became corroded in a few months time. The destruction was of such a magnitude as to require frequent periodic replacement of the glass in the windows of several buildings. It was noted, also, that men wearing spectacles, who work in the acid atmosphere, were continually required to renew the lenses of their eyepieces.

A few workers engaged near anhydrous acid retorts were seen with a condition of hyperemia of the skin of the face, transitory in nature, and due ostensibly to exposure to momentarily higher-than-usual concentrations of hydrofluoric acid in the air. Despite precautions against exposure, the skin of the face and hands of the acid workers as a whole was notably dehydrated, roughened, and irritated. Variation in the susceptibility of different individuals to the irritating influence of the acid was encountered by the Company, it being found that most fair-complexioned men could not be employed in the production plant.

Miscellany

Ulcerous lesions, chiefly on the hands and forearms, were observed in men who had accidentally been splashed by the acid. Protection of the feet was accomplished by the employment of rubber boots. This measure was instituted when it was found that ordinary leather shoes would disintegrate as a result of the action of the acid, particularly on the shoe nails.

Milk was an important ingredient of the diets of a large majority of the acid workers. Several veterans of the production plant expressed teh opinion that they felt better and worked more efficiently with a "full stomach" containing plenty of that dairy product.

Since large quantities of vitriol are employed in the production of hydrofluoric acid, it may be possible that some of the effects described are attributable to the influence of sulphuric acid.

Recommendations

An analysis of the observations suggests certain procedures and tests designed to extend the study begun by the examinations:

1. A Iactobacillus study of exposed and unexposed individuals.

2. Urinalysis for fluoride in both groups.

3. A photographis study of superficial and ulcerous lesions caused by acid exposure.

4. Analysis of the dental plaque material found on the teeth of exposed workers.

5. Gross and microscopic studies of dental tissues from exposed and unexposed persons.

6. Studies of the effects of dilute and anhydrous hydrofluoric acid on the teeth of men (in vitro) and dogs (in vivo). These experiments should be planned to yield data regarding solubility and physical changes.

Signed

Peter P. Dale
Dental Pathologist

H. Berton McCauley
Dental Consultant

Some General Background on Harshaw Chemical

from the Department of Energy

http://legacystory.apps.em.doe.gov/thestory/text/link/link8.htm

Beginning in 1944, the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant converted UO 3 to uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) feed for the Calutron electromagnetic spectrograph. Harshaw and DuPont produced hexafluoride (UF6) from UF 4 as feed for the S-50 Thermal Diffusion and K-25 Gaseous Diffusion projects in Oak Ridge. By early 1945, the S-50 and K-25 plants were supplying low-enriched UF 6 , which was also converted to UCl4 at Y-12 to be further enriched in Calutrons. . .

Several sites refined black oxide and sodium diuranate to orange oxide (UO 3 ) and then to brown oxide (UO2). Mallinckrodt produced about two thirds of the UO 2 while DuPont produced most of the remaining one third in its Deepwater, New Jersey plant-the Chambers Dye Works. Linde and Harshaw Chemical in Cleveland, Ohio also produced UO 2 . In July 1942, Mallinckrodt began using ether to purify uranium in a solvent extraction process and DuPont followed suit. However, more than half of the DuPont product came from uranium peroxide obtained by processing uranium-bearing scrap. UO 3 and UO 2 were, in turn, refined into green salt (UF 4 ) by DuPont, Harshaw, Mallinckrodt, and Linde. Mallinckrodt was the major producer. . .

Harshaw Chemical continued to produce most of the UF 6 feed for the K-25 uranium enrichment plant at its Cleveland, Ohio plant after the war. However, in December 1947, the F2 Plant at K-25 became operational, allowing the plant to produce its own feed by initially converting UO 3 to UO 2 to UF 4 to UF 6 and later UO 2 to UF 6 . Harshaw expanded its UF 6 production in 1947, and was placed on standby by May 1953. When the Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants were built and started up in 1954 and 1956, they included feed operations similar to that at K-25. The Oak Ridge, Portsmouth and Paducah feed plants were shut down in 1962, and the conversion of U 3 O 8 to UF 6 for gaseous diffusion plant feed was taken over by the privately-owned Allied Chemical Co. Plant in Metropolis, Illinois. Thereafter, UF 6 feed came from commercial sources, existing stocks, and partially-depleted UF 6 tails stored at the enrichment plants.

from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER)

http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_9/9-1/forgottn.html

Harshaw Chemical Co., Cleveland, Ohio

Harshaw Chemical Co. conducted a number of chemical operations to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for uranium enrichment operations. Part-time operations began during the World War II Manhattan Project, during which highly enriched uranium was used to make the nuclear bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. UF6 production at Harshaw was scaled up after the war and substantially expanded in 1947.

The chemical forms of uranium present at Harshaw range from the highly soluble (uranium hexafluoride) to the highly insoluble (uranium dioxide). Industrial hygiene was very poor, with air contamination exceeding the maximum allowable in some cases by several hundred fold, averaged over the entire working day.

Assuming that workers were exposed to the same mix of uranium compounds as seen at the Fernald nuclear weapons plant near Cincinnati, as would be likely for at least some portion of the plant personnel, the radiation doses to the lungs of workers in moderately exposed categories would be in the hundreds of rem, cumulative. A bar chart of worker doses at Harshaw is shown in Figure 2. . .

Also, the manufacture of uranium hexafluoride involves the use of severely toxic chemicals, including fluorine. Moreover, when uranium hexafluoride makes contact with the humidity in the air (which would be high in the Cleveland area during at least some parts of the year), it readily combines with water vapor to yield uranyl fluoride and hydrofluoric acid, which is highly toxic.

The following are excerpts from the USA Today's Special 3 part report ("Poisoned Workers and Poisoned Places," Sept. 6-8, 2000) on the US Cold War Nuclear Program. The full report can be accessed on the web at http://www.usatoday.com/news/poison/cover.htm

"CLEVELAND - In January 1948, Bernard Wolf came here to assure workers at Harshaw Chemical Co. that the uranium they secretly processed for the government's nuclear weapons program posed no threat to their health.

In fact, Wolf, a medical director with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, had evidence of serious dangers. His staff had done classified studies at Harshaw's restricted "Area C" plant and found that concentrations of radioactive uranium dust in the air reached 200 times the safety limits of the day.

Having alerted Harshaw to the problems, Wolf wanted workers' urine checked for signs of kidney damage. But company officials worried that the tests might alarm employees, so they asked that he come out first to allay any fears among the men.

"It is easy to understand that extensive sample-taking of this character may cause (workers) to wonder about their health," Wolf's boss wrote to Harshaw executives just after the doctor's trip. "It was for this reason that Dr. Wolf (visited) to explain to them that all of our records indicated that no unusual hazard existed."

Actually, the severe hazards already documented at Harshaw were getting worse.

By late 1948, medical officials in the nuclear weapons program were reporting that nearly all of the 100 workers at Area C were overexposed to radioactive dust, with a third of them breathing 140 to 374 times the safety limit. Wolf, who is now deceased, raised concerns that the exposures could cause cancers, kidney problems and other illnesses that might not show up for decades.

"Workers (at Harshaw) will have to be followed medically very carefully in the future to detect the earliest signs of any damage," Wolf's staff reported.

But after Harshaw's work for the nuclear weapons program ended in the mid-1950s, no one returned to check the workers' health or tell them of their risks.

Here and elsewhere, thousands of workers were left in the dark about the often severe hazards they faced while working for private companies that were hired secretly in the 1940s and '50s to process radioactive and toxic material for nuclear weapons. Fifty years later, many of the survivors have increased chances of cancer, as well as kidney, lung and other diseases as a result of their work. But there's been almost no effort to learn whether such illnesses have occurred or contributed to any deaths."

"Some examples of the types of operations Ñ and risks Ñ that defined the contracting effort:

Big uranium-refining and -processing plants in Cleveland; St. Louis; Canonsburg, Pa.; Deepwater, N.J; and outside Boston and Buffalo handled some of the most dangerous operations. At Harshaw Chemical Co. in Cleveland, for example, classified AEC studies in the late '40s and early '50s found that employees faced "severe exposures" to uranium dust and beta radiation, and workers' kidneys regularly showed signs of uranium poisoning. During that time, records show, the plant also pumped 350 to 500pounds of uranium dust from its stacks each month, spewing it over nearby areas. The site remains contaminated."

"For decades, the government suppressed classified reports on dozens of contracting sites where workers faced extreme levels of radiation and airborne toxins from beryllium, fluorides and other dangerous chemicals. One 1949 survey of hazards at seven firms processing uranium in St. Louis and Cleveland and at facilities outside Pittsburgh and Buffalo found high radioactive dust levels at every one. Of 648 workers at those sites, the partially declassified survey noted, 40% had average exposures at least five times the safety limit; 10% were at least 125 times the limit."

"Most all the guys are dead now. Cancer, kidneys, lung problems, you see a lot of that," says John Smith, 87, a Harshaw retiree who worked on the uranium-processing operation. "I feel lucky to be alive, but I'm worried. It makes you bitter, them knowing about the risks and not telling. If I'd known, I would have quit."

Hidden dangers

"The frontline workers at Harshaw were practically the only ones involved in the weapons operation there who didn't know about the risks they faced.

By 1948, the plant was one of the weapons program's two biggest producers of uranium compounds. Te other was Mallinckrodt Chemical Works in St. Louis. Both were notorious among AEC health officials for safety problems.

As radiation levels at Harshaw soared, commission officials repeatedly warned the company, but their recommendations for corrective action were ignored. "No significant progress has been made in correcting the hazardous conditions," one top AEC manager wrote in a testy 1949 letter to Harshaw executives. The AEC official added that the company "could correct all of these conditions (if) management were seriously concerned."

But such worries had no effect on the AEC's production quotas. By 1950, the plant was running up to 24 hours a day, and workers' radiation and fluoride exposures continued to climb.

It wasn't until the early 1950s, almost 10 years after Harshaw began doing weapons work, that new, dust-catching ventilation hoods were installed in the plant and the air quality problems began to subside. Records suggest the change was driven as much by the AEC's desire to recoup precious uranium as by health concerns.

Some workers suspected that their jobs might be more dangerous than they were led to believe. Suspicions grew as men were mysteriously taken out of the plant after urine tests. In one 10-month period spanning 1950 and 1951, nine workers were dispatched with kidney ailments diagnosed as uranium poisoning. But there were no explanations.

"No one ever told us there was a problem," says Smith, the Harshaw retiree. "The guys who got pulled out, we thought it was because there was something already wrong with them, maybe they were drinking too much and it showed up in their urine."

The Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, based in Maryland, estimates that workers with the worst cumulative radiation exposures at Harshaw got the equivalent of a whole-body radiation dose of about 1,000 rem. That level corresponds to a 40% chance of dying from cancer over a lifetime and a 200% increase in cancer risk compared with unexposed persons. Their chances for kidney and respiratory problems are also substantially higher.

Surviving workers recall dust coating the plant floor. It stung their faces, gave them rashes.

The men were told to wear respirators during some tasks, but "they were uncomfortable," says James Southern, 76, who worked on Harshaw's uranium operation in the late 1940s and '50s. He notes that many men used the masks only sporadically and rarely bothered to change the filters. "They never told us why we needed them. If they had, they wouldn't have had anyone working there."

Examples of some contractors' pollution and its effects:

Big uranium refineries, such as Mallinckrodt Chemical in St. Louis and the Linde Air Products and Electro Metallurgical plants near Buffalo, spewed thousands of pounds of radioactive dust from stacks each year. Weapons work at Cleveland's Harshaw Chemical from 1942 into 1953 vented up to 4,000 pounds of radioactive uranium-fluoride particles annually, making it a "major contributor" to local air pollution, AEC officials reported in 1949.

When the city sought information, the report was heavily censored. AEC officials noted that the city was not given "any data over and beyond the immediate needs for public relations."